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Law and ANT (and its Kin): Possibilities, Challenges, and
Ways Forward
Emilie Cloatre*
This article interrogates the contributions that Actor-Network Theory
(ANT) has made, and can continue to make, to the critical study of law.
Both within its original field of Science and Technology Studies (STS)
and beyond, ANT has enabled a reimagining of the `social' as rela-
tional, heterogeneous, and fluid. In turn, it has argued for a renewed
attention to materiality in social analysis. For law, such approach is
potentially fruitful, significant, and disruptive of a number of assump-
tions of previous (socio-)legal scholarship. In this article, I sketch out
key elements (and critiques) of ANT, previous efforts to bring ANT into
law, and discuss its potential for enhancing understandings of law. At
the same time, I argue that ANT in law is best approached with a
commitment to care, and to kinship, and in conversation with feminist
thinkers, legal ethnographies, and the discrete voices of law.
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to provide a concise guide to how actor-network theory
(ANT) has been used, and could be used, in the context of socio-legal studies
and the critical study of law. The task, however, is not easy, for a number of
reasons. First, ANT has become a vast and shifting field: since its inception
ANT has been critiqued, revisited, reinterpreted, and further developed. It
has also integrated new ideas, nuances, and vocabularies. Suitably, given the
approach it proposes, different versions of ANT have in fact long coexisted.
Second, a broad range of scholarship, that is not explicitly or exclusively
`ANT', has become seen as part of its broader `kinship' (some, but not all, of
it labelled as `post-ANT'). Finally, understandings of what ANT may mean
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for law are still evolving, and have themselves been varied. Even though law
has not translated ANT as extensively as other disciplines have, there is no
clear and single identifiable `law and ANT' body of scholarship ± which,
again, is consistent for this type of approach. In this introduction, I am
deliberately adopting a broad reading of what ANT can be said to be about,
rather than advocating that it should be read as a unified set of principles for
legal studies. I argue that while ANT continues to have significant potential
for our understanding of law, it could be at its most useful if we are to adopt
a reading that takes seriously both other relevant insights from
interdisciplinary legal studies, and feminist and postcolonial critiques of
ANT. As a result, this article calls for a double movement of, first, engaging
ANT's key original ideas in order to reimagine both law and society as fluid
and heterogeneous, and, secondly, of translating it in conversation with other
scholars that have enabled us to complicate both our understanding of the
multiple lives of law in practice, and of the significance of a `standpoint' in
theorizing. I wish, then, to propose not a definitive guide to what ANT can
do for legal studies, but a more modest set of suggestions as to how it could
be used to productively help us further unpack the complexity and diversity
of the liveliness of law that others have also drawn out, beyond its institu-
tions and its own internal claims, so as to venture into new terrains through
relational, material/semiotic thinking ± a suggestion, thus, to approach ANT
with an ethics of `thinking with'.1
The article starts with a brief summary of the origins of ANT, of its core
concepts, and of some of its feminist kin (which I see as particularly
productive for thinking through ANT in legal studies). It moves on to
explore how it has been taken up in legal scholarship, both in relation to
materiality and to the fluidity of the social. It draws attention to Bruno
Latour's much commented upon engagement with law, while interrogating
other potential readings of ANT for law, and alternative intellectual agendas.
It concludes by proposing that ANT in law be read with a commitment to
care, and to kinship, and in conversation with feminist thinkers, legal
ethnographies, and the discrete voices of law.
BACKGROUND
Although this short piece does not allow for a full history of ANT's complex
origins, it is worth briefly summing up some of its key aspects.2 ANT
emerged from Science and Technology Studies (STS), relatively early in the
development of the discipline. Its foundational texts were written throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, and its ideas have since then continued to be translated
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and rethought as it entered new fields.3 Its reach extended through the
development of other post-human theories.4 The context of early days STS
matters to understanding the initial claims of ANT: ANT is part of the
discipline's efforts to explore science as a social activity, and scientific
knowledge as a particular type of social practice. STS worked from its
inception to explore the social loadedness and the political dimensions of
science as an institution (including how questions of power, inclusion, and
exclusion are at play in scientific processes). Overall, it enabled the closed
world of science to be subjected to the sort of critical inquiry that science as
an institution had long avoided in the name of its neutrality and its claims to
`objective knowledge'.5
ANT was part of this broader effort. In Laboratory Life, one of the early
expressions of what would become ANT, the process of construction that is
at play within the laboratory is scrutinized.6 The work of scientists is
described as one in which humans and non-humans are mobilized to translate
discoveries into settled (for a while, at least) scientific knowledge enabled to
circulate. From there, however, ANT took a particular stance within STS
scholarship both in relation to the `radical' claims it made of science itself
and, more importantly for our purpose, of society. It also became critiqued
and challenged both within and outside STS, to which I will return.
ANT continued to evolve first within STS, and later in a broader range of
fields and disciplines ± complicating any possibility of providing a generic
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overview of its core ideas, or indeed of affirming who its main `spokes-
persons' could or should be. If early scholars in ANT are relatively easy to
identify (Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law, Annemarie Mol, and
Marilyn Strathern are often cited as key players in its initial development),
its translations to date both within each of these initial scholars' work, and in
that of others, complicate any attempt to give an authoritative summary of
what ANT is or is not. A distinction is often drawn between `classical ANT'
(its early, foundational texts) and a variety of newer, `post-ANT', texts,
including scholarship that shares some of its sensibilities (and which I refer
to in my analysis below).7 In this article, and in order to avoid the ANT-
centrism that some uses of the `post-ANT' label can carry, I choose instead
to refer to works that are `related', or `kin', to ANT. Overall, rather than
seeking to essentialize ANT as being about a particular moment or set of
ideas, or indeed as being isolated from other forms of analysis, it is more
productive to approach it as a field that has always been relatively fluid and
`in the making'. Thus, I shall suggest in this article that its most promising
future in legal studies may depend on our ability to embrace this multiplicity.
Although it has at times been seen as a `stand-alone' theory that seeks to
provide a radical reimagining of society, ANT has a number of recognized
sources of inspiration. As well as the questioning developed in STS, ANT
has identified its primary intellectual roots in Tarde (in his particular atten-
tion to heterogeneity and networked connections),8 Whitehead (in his
working against the divide between nature and society, as well as his
attention to the making of durability),9 Serres (with his thinking through
quasi-objects),10 and in ethnomethodology, with its particular approach to
micro-interactions as rich sources of social analysis.11 These mixed origins
in mostly philosophy (rather than social theory) and in a particular strand of
social scientific method, are significant in grasping what ANT is `about'.
KEY TENETS
ANT is classically associated with a few key tenets. The principle of
symmetry (or `radical' symmetry), and its impact on how materiality should
be approached, is maybe the best known aspect of ANT's contributions to
649
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understandings of society, and indeed it provides a useful starting point. The
proposition is that social theory should not assume that the `social' is, wholly
or even primarily, about humans, and that humans, in turn, occupy a place
that is fundamentally different from that of others ± be they objects, animals,
nature, and so on. For ANT, by having privileged humans in their analysis,
social scientists have missed a trick, and failed to understand the complexity
of the world. In We have Never Been Modern,12 Latour famously opens his
discussion, and his initial explanation of this idea, by presenting the range of
interventions that things are making in the front pages of a newspaper ±
microbes, technologies, climate change, all come to disrupt events and
remake worlds. They are, he argues, at least as powerful as the humans that
need to adjust, respond, and react to them. Pre-assuming the significance of
one set of actors over the others in social analysis, in his view, is no more
than the inherent bias of the `Moderns'. In his analysis, Latour challenges
two dichotomies on which the `Moderns' (our `tribe', that claims to be
different from all that preceded them) have based their stories: the
dichotomy between `Nature' and `Society', and that between `Humans'
and `Non-Humans'. Instead of such divides, ANT proposes to reimagine
society as relational. The principle of symmetry rests on the assumption that,
ontologically, the world is made of heterogeneous networks that are not
exclusively or even `particularly' guided by human actors. Things fall into
order in a particular way because of alliances between heterogeneous sets of
actors ± be they texts, technologies, microbes, humans, or scallops.13 In such
processes of temporary stabilization, some actors may be better connected,
or indeed inevitable for particular actions to take place (those that Callon
names `obligatory passage points').14 Others will be enrolled under particu-
lar circumstances, enabling a particular network to hold in a temporary form.
Such heterogenous relations are essential to the constitution of events, and
such heterogeneous relationality is, for ANT, neglected in other approaches
to society. In The Pasteurization of France,15 Latour proposes to reimagine
Pasteur not as an isolated scientific hero who made a great discovery, but in
his relations with the many actors, human and non-human, within and
beyond his laboratory, that made his discovery `hold' (and in this sense,
possible). Pasteur in his story is only `Pasteur' because of his ability to
connect with those others, and to keep them connected and `interested'. This
idea of relationality would remain at the core of ANT in its multiple
650
12 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (1993).
13 M. Callon, `Some elements in a sociology of translation: domestication of the
scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay' in Power, Action and Belief: A New
Sociology of Knowledge?, ed. J. Law (1986) 196. See, also, J. Law, `On the Methods
of Long-Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation and the Portuguese Route to India'
(1984) 32 Sociological Rev. 234.
14 Callon, id.
15 B. Latour, The Pasteurization of France (1988).
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iterations and versions. It is perhaps even more fundamental than the focus
on materiality in itself: it calls for a revisiting of how society is constituted,
emphasizing both its contingency, and the entanglement of actors within one
another. `Society' is constituted by the myriad of relations that are built
between what Latour called `actants' ± entities that do things and create
events.16 Events, in turn, can be reimagined as moments of destabilization:
actants hold a particular form, or a particular role, only as long as certain
relations continue to exist. When those are transformed (for example, when a
new entity becomes a part of their world), they act (and when they act, they
are further transformed) and so they affect the relationships that surround
and compose them.
It is useful at this stage to say a little bit more about `materiality', what it
means to imagine materiality as relational, and its ontological implications.
Indeed, ANT also offers a particular definition of materiality as complex,
fluid, and ontologically multiple. Multiplicity is a particularly important
feature of materials, of society, but also potentially of our readings of law, as
I return to below. Multiplicity in ANT is an ontological, rather than
epistemological issue: it is not a recognition of the coexistence of different
readings or different meanings of the world but, rather, an emphasis on the
very coexistence of worlds. The works of Annemarie Mol and John Law17
have greatly participated in directing attention to ontological multiplicities.
For them, the world is composed of `multiple materialities performing
themselves in manifold ways'.18
For the ANT analyst, materials are not fixed in the way they may appear,
but are `vibrant' (to borrow from Jane Bennett19). As they move and create
new social relations, they become other. In this way, they do not pre-exist
society, but are co-produced by it. Examples of this abound in ANT literature
± waterpumps,20 documents,21 microbes,22 doors23 are all a different thing
depending on the set of relations they create. While objects are loaded with
their own initial `script' (the particular set of expectations of what they
should do, how they should work, and what they need in order to work, that
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19 Bennett, op. cit., n. 4.
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their creators `built in'),24 they become a new thing where such expectations
are not met. When so, they become ontologically different, behave
otherwise, and do different things. ANT classically avoids seeing such
transformation or discrepancies as `failures', at least analytically.25 Instead,
the less expected effects of technologies, away from their initial script, are
themselves informative both of social relations, but also of the richness of
the technology itself. Objects that have not followed their scripts (and we can
here start thinking about the implications for legal objects) navigate and
create new relations; they also produce and mediate relations with human
actors, and between human actors (as well as between human actors and
other things). The landscape of relations shifts in this process, producing a
new form of reality. This richness and complexity of materials is why ANT
calls for a different form of attention to their role in defining what society is
made of. ANT and its understanding of materiality suggests that society is
both fluid and multiple, as are things themselves. The ambivalence of
materials between stability and fluidity is captured by John Law in the idea
of `immutable mobiles': material objects have the ability of remaining
apparently solid while being socially mobile and acquiring new identities as
they travel.26 Marilyn Strathern approaches this ambivalence by
emphasizing the fractal nature of the world: connections and relations are
always inevitably partial, worlds multiple, and our ability to seize and
describe it inevitably incomplete.27 Vicky Singleton draws attention to the
ambivalent positioning of particular actors who can be one thing or another
depending on the set of connections they are involved in for each particular
purpose.28 With this emphasis on multiple and complex materialities as
constitutive of the social, ANT proposes a reimagining of humans as well as
non-humans. Humans become better defined as hybrids,29 always constituted
through the connections they make with materialities, and thus as inherently
relational. Such rethinking of humans relates very closely (though her
purpose is more openly political) to Donna Haraway's reading of humans as
cyborgs: non-unique and non-isolated, yet always politically loaded in this
materiality and hybridity.30
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517.
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29 B. Latour, `Pragmatogonies: A Mythical Account of How Humans and Non-Humans
Swap Properties' (1994) 37 Am. Behavioral Scientist 791.
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Through its emphasis on heterogeneous connections and their fluidity,
ANT is an approach of the `micro'. It has been built through an attention to
how apparently `small' moments, or seemingly simple technologies, could
tell stories of social contingency and complexity.31 It has also been par-
ticularly critical of any effort to provide set explanatory frameworks. Instead,
concepts classically used to `explain' become what needs to be explained
through a renewed attention to the micro-connections that form the whole.
For example, `power' is classically something that is `constructed' (in the
sense of built/made) for ANT, and instead of assuming particular patterns of
power as explainants of a given situation, we should look at how particular
connections have enabled power to circulate and be replicated, and to deter-
mine how a particular actor (or set of actors) came to be so well connected
that it can exercise particular influence on the network.32 For ANT, there are
no external, pre-existing structures, since everything is the effect of ongoing
connections. Networks themselves need to be approached as `flat' (that is,
thick description should not presume particular positions of power), and the
role of social analysis should be to explain how a particular set of connec-
tions happen to become stable and durable.33 Power is produced by the
ability of particular configurations to hold together for a period of time, and
it should be interrogated by unpacking those very connections, rather than
assuming that they pre-exist in a set form as a given explanatory framework
that is to be superimposed.
This particular aspect of ANT has been heavily critiqued, as generating an
apolitical strategy that effectively effaces the violent histories and embedded
power imbalances that constitute social relations.34 To put it simply, if the
idea here is that we should then not take account of such categories as
gender, race, class, or concepts such as neo-liberalism or postcoloniality in
our analysis, it is easy to see why ANT would be seen as at best problematic,
and at worst as dangerous. This seems to be particularly so in law, where
such patterns and histories are significant, and have indeed been
demonstrated by an extensive (and growing) scholarship. ANT's response
to such critiques has classically been that it does not seek to deny these
categories, but that they should not be used as shortcuts. Empirical investi-
gations are expected not only to make them visible, but also give us a richer
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16.
32 This approach to power is reminiscent of aspects of Foucauldian thought, where
ANT's roots are visible, though not always explicitly acknowledged: notably, M.
Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1979) and M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1
(1981).
33 J. Law, `Objects and Spaces' (2002) 19(5/6) Theory, Culture and Society 91.
34 S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives
(1991); S. Harding, Sciences from Below: Feminism, Postcolonialities, and Moderni-
ties (2008); W. Anderson, `Introduction: Postcolonial Technoscience' (2002) 32
Social Studies of Science 643.
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account of how they are produced: `following the actors', as Latour reminds
us we should do, is expected to help us unearth discrete movements and
connections that constitute `power'.35
Others, however, while otherwise sympathetic to ANT sensibilities, have
pointed out that even in classic ANT studies, some voices had not emerged
as much as others in the rewriting of networks.36 For example, The
Pasteurization of France still remained focused on the (still, arguably, rather
heroic though more connected) scientist as enroller, and did not make the
less acknowledged humans of everyday laboratory practices particularly
visible. Within science studies, feminist and postcolonial approaches
developed ways to move away from classic top-down, Westerned, and
gendered understandings of science.37 In particular, feminist thinking has
furthered post-human sensibilities with a more attuned attention to such
conceptual challenges, embracing those difficulties rather than pushing them
to the side ± `staying with the trouble'.38 They constitute part of a broader set
of STS post-human scholarship (for some, `post-ANT', although, crucially,
Haraway and Harding's ideas developed both prior to and alongside ANT)
that are not only worth bringing into our discussion for the purpose of this
article, but also, as I argue below, well worth working with in future attempts
to bring ANT into legal studies. Notably, Donna Haraway has been a
powerful advocate for a reading of social contingency and heterogeneity that
also enables a critical attention to positionality ± a `critical kin' to ANT. She
suggests a nuanced approach to post-human ontologies, in which we
recognize the inherent limitations of our own perceptions as researchers, as
well as the pursuit of a political agenda as a necessary part of research
endeavours. In other words, focusing on the micro-level and `following the
actor' (as ANT has often proposed as symbolic of its methods), is not
enough: we need to remain alert to our own role within the very networks we
seek to describe, within the academic fields of knowledge that we seek to
develop, and within the broader worlds we are connecting to. Focusing on
the question of standpoint, she sums up its ethical and political significance
as follows:
I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision, and so reclaim the
sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body,
and into a conquering gaze from nowhere. This is the gaze that mythically
654
35 B. Latour, `The powers of associations' in Law (ed.), op. cit., n. 13, p. 264.
36 S.L. Star, `Power, technologies and the phenomenology of conventions: on being
allergic to onions' in A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and
Domination, ed. J. Law (1991) 26; J. Law, `Introduction: monsters, machines and
sociotechnical relations' in Law (ed.), id., p. 1.
37 E. Martin, The Woman in the Body (1989); E. Martin, `Anthropology and cultural
study of science' (1998) 23 Science, Technology and Human Value 24; Harding, op.
cit. (1991 and 2008), n. 34; see, also, S. Harding, The Feminist Standpoint Theory
Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies (2004).
38 Haraway, op. cit. (2016), n. 4.
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inscribes all the marked bodies, and that makes the unmarked category claim
the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation.
This gaze signifies the unmarked positions of Man and White.39
Feminist scholars have productively engaged with the early critiques of
ANT's flat ontology as not being able to account for the politics of exclusion
that are fostered by relational existences. While avoiding the super-
imposition of social categories (that ANT has fought against) onto individual
scenarios, they propose ways to acknowledge silencing as a matter we need
to continue to care for, without imposing our end point or ready-made
theories. Maria Puig de la Bellacasa sums up such an approach as a
`speculative commitment':
A commitment because it is indeed attached to situated and positioned visions
of what a livable and caring world could be; but one that remains speculative,
by not letting a situation or a position ± or even the acute awareness of
pervasive dominations ± define in advance what is or could be.40
In the analysis that follows, I review how ANT has been approached in law,
and suggest that ways forward in furthering its contributions should adopt
such a speculative commitment.
ANT AND LAW
ANT (in all its variants) has been taken up in law, though less extensively,
and arguably with less impact to date than in other fields, such as economics
and critical finance studies.41 A degree of interest in ANT by legal scholars
was to be expected, maybe, given some of the parallels between the
narratives that law and science tell about themselves (that is, as particular
systems that work towards truth and settlement), their social authority, but
also the obvious dependency on materials that they share. In law, like in
science, particular spaces participate in the making of authority, documents
enable the translation of such authority and its travels, and materials
(including bodies, animals, things) need to be mobilized, disciplined, and
controlled. From the `classical ANT' phase, Marilyn Strathern's42 contribu-
tions included an analysis of how regimes of property came to constrain
networks and produce particular forms of relationality, and to impose
particular readings of relations that were imbued with Western assumptions.
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Privilege of a Partial Perspective' in Technoscience: The Politics of Intervention, eds.
K. Asdal et al. (2007) 109, at 114.
40 Puig de la Bellacasa, op. cit., n. 3, p. 60.
41 For example, M. Callon, `Actor-network theory ± the market test' in Actor Network
Theory and After, eds. J. Law and J. Hassard (1999) 181; Muniesa et al., op. cit., n. 3.
42 M. Strathern, `What is intellectual property after?' in Law and Hassard (eds.), id., p.
156.
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Annelise Riles built upon such readings by broadening her attention to the
role of legal documents as agents within complex networks, and as co-
producing realities through technicalities.43 Her work invited legal scholars
to pay closer attention to documents as thick materials, and complex agents
in the making of social relations. Over the following decades, the implica-
tions of ANT for understanding what law is and how it operates became a
growing part of interdisciplinary legal scholarship. Legal objects were
scrutinized in their material expression (and as always more than `simply'
materials), from consent forms44 to legal files,45 leases,46 homes and owner-
ship47 or patents.48 Courtrooms as sites of law making were interrogated in
the light of approaches influenced by ANT (though not necessarily
exclusively so).49 As scholars thought to bring ANT influences into the
study of legal events, they interrogated broader elements of the making of
governance and bureaucracies, meeting other strands of scholarship that has
paid attention to material constitutions and the heterogeneity of power.50
Bruno Latour's own study of the Conseil d'EÂ tat,51 and his further engage-
ment with law as a `mode of existence', provided a particular approach to the
analysis of how law operates and exerts specific forms of action. In studying
this distinct French institution, he remains close to early approaches of ANT
to the laboratory, and their tracing of scientists' work as a way to understand
better the workings of science as an institution. His intervention has been
commented upon extensively, and at times critically,52 and it remains an
important moment of intervention as one of the few (though not only, given
Marilyn Strathern's work, in particular53) early ANT scholars exploring into
the field of law. At the same time, I am keen to move beyond this particular
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reading ± and maybe propose building on a broader range of voices to suggest
a `law and ANT' agenda that continues to open up questions, black-boxes,
and positionalities.
1. Beyond materials in law and ANT
Although a significant part of ANT and law scholarship has brought the
former's attention on artefacts to the fore, thinking in law through ANT has
also always involved more than a focus on materiality for its own sake.54
Indeed, the material shift was always inherently linked to ANT's other
tenets: the relationality of the social, the fluidity of ordering, (un)settlements
and world-making, the multiplicity of realities and actors, the undoing of
categorizations and boundaries in social analysis, the work away from
structural frameworks to micro-events. In law, as elsewhere, these tenets
enable us to reopen what looks settled, solid, and black-boxed, to unpick the
scripts that objects, technologies, documents, or humans, may carry, and to
observe the unfolding of those scripts through new connections and rela-
tions.55 To legal scholars, this means paying attention to the complexity of
legal objects in their great diversity, their transformation in the different
worlds they become part of, their deviation from the original scripts they
may have been allocated, and their reimagining and recapturing through new
connections. In this way, ANT is a potentially useful entry point, or toolbox,
to understand the silent ways in which law may work through the travels of
materials that are already loaded with meanings, yet go on to, relationally,
`do their own thing' with it. As I argue further below, this potential is more
likely to be realized if building on the broader critical kin of ANT.
Yet, ANT's emphasis on the fluidity of the social also means having to re-
engage with the very nature of law as a social category, discipline,
institution, and label, exploring its daily workings across contexts, staying
attuned to its ontological multiplicity (both as individual texts, principles,
decisions, objects, and as an institution with its own mode of existence) ±
tolerating, as Silbey and Ewick also suggested, `a kind of conceptual
murkiness' about how to capture the law, and indeed what is to be cap-
tured.56 This murkiness (or `messiness' as ANT more commonly phrases it)
is complicated further because the modes of action of law are themselves
entangled in folding, fluid, and multiple realities ± including temporal and
spatial.57 Law in this way is one (or a network) of the elements that con-
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tribute to `ontological choreographies'.58 When law as an object of analysis
becomes unclear, the co-constitution of materiality, practices, and norms
also calls for a critical attention to what the `social' may look like as a
starting point to socio-legal analysis.59 Overall, a relatively obvious
consequence of ANT's principles of symmetry and relationality is to
dissolve the pertinence of the dichotomy between law and society that others
had previously started undoing, but also of law in society: it proposes,
instead, the rethinking of such a field as entirely relational.
2. Fluidity, multiplicity, and legalities
With its emphasis on messiness and co-relations, approaching law through
the lens of ANT can bring a number of conceptual difficulties, and empirical
challenges. ANT's emphasis on `following the actors' can prove empirically
difficult precisely when leaving the institutions of law, where its traces
become more discreet and mobile. More crucially, maybe, emphasizing the
fluidity of boundaries and dichotomies can lead us to lose sight of the
particularity of law as a site of practice and as an object of analysis. If we are
to see law as relational, and as a site of entanglements of other forms of
practice and other actors, and if we are to approach it through the flat and
symmetrical eyes that classical ANT suggests, then it can become difficult if
not impossible to get a sense of law as an object of analysis. In other words,
the emphasis on fluidity and material entanglements may very well result in
a certain analytical erosion of law and of its particularity as a site of
authority. Here, critiques may meet those of legal consciousness and its
suggestion that law should be read through the experiences and translations
of others, rather than through the particularity of its own institutions.60 Such
criticism needs to be taken seriously, yet the issue it raises can be reimagined
as a starting point rather than an end point, and as a set of questions, rather
than affirmations. They nudge us not to take for granted the particularities of
law, but to unpack them in their multiplicity, and in the sites where they are
less obvious and, maybe, less dependent on legal institutions' own claims.
Those sites where law is ambivalent, is only evoked or is reimagined,
impacts in ways that were not expected, sees its authority being re-read,
travels where it shouldn't be or indeed is derided where it should be
impactful, are also sites in which this ambivalence of the law can be most
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fruitfully explored ± sites of friction where we are less certain of what it
means to be `legal'.61
Focusing on these more fragile sites of legality means shifting away from
what law is in its own `laboratories' or centres of powers, to how it works in
the sites that it is seeking to control, or indeed is not expected to interest,
transform or act. By exploring these more uncertain modes of `legal' action
in these more uncertain sites of legal presence, we may be able to return to
the question of what law is, but maybe more fruitfully where law is (what are
its material sites?) and how it operates. Importantly, fluidity does not mean
full malleability ± accepting the law as relational and as not predetermined
does not have to mean that it does not maintain a presence or particular
modes of action, but that those are multiple, discrete, and always retrans-
lated. It is part of broader processes of ongoing (re)making and ordering, in
which particular connections that come to be see as legal are made and carry
a particular strength through contextualized and heterogeneous mechanisms.
As we explore such sites and processes, we may think not only of questions
about definitions of law or of the `legal', but also of why law matters, not in
an abstract, generalized or universal sense, but in the situated practices of
micro-interactions and (un)settlements. Looking at the ways in which silent
legalities shape the everyday, producing particular temporary orderings, is
also about how those can be undone, reimagined or reclaimed.
3. Future directions, continuity, and disruption
In my reading, ANT's emphasis on the fluidity and multiplicity of the social
has at least two implications for legal scholarship: first, it invites a
conceptual (and speculative) rethinking of the nature of law as a field of
practice (and its modes of action), which suggests that the boundaries of law
should remain under close scrutiny, rather than be assumed as fixed, or even
recognizable through pre-defined criteria. This thinking of law as practice is
articulated through a reading of material connections, that opens up both the
sites in which legal relations are played out, and the modalities through
which they are enacted. Its attention to materiality as and in practice under-
lies how and where ANT distinguishes itself from other conceptual
approaches to law, and the type of inquiries that it can open. Secondly,
there is a methodological implication, in that this approach invites us to
return to careful ethnographic engagements with the manifestations of these
(uncertain) modes of heterogeneous legal ordering in everyday life, in ways
that place ontological multiplicity at the core of the analysis. I would also
suggest that such consequences are most powerful when we acknowledge the
many other critical works that such ideas can build upon, or learn from ±
both constructive critiques of the blind spots of ANT, and works that have
already contributed to our reimagining of the boundaries of law as fluid and
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negotiated, and of its existence as multiple. This is both a political and an
intellectual agenda, and one committed to meaningfully acknowledging the
feminist readings that have enhanced some key aspects of ANT sensibilities,
while not necessarily labelling themselves as ANT. My suggestion of
bringing them into the heart of our engagement with law and ANT is
therefore also a call for more thorough attention to the politics of citing and
constructing a field, inherent to the act of summarizing and characterizing a
particular method or theory ± if ANT is about connections and kinship, its
translation into legal studies should make such kinship visible.
Because of its understanding of the social as relational, multiple, and
contingent, ANT is a useful resource towards interrogating the fluidity of
law and its multiple existences. Such understandings, however, have also
been proposed by others who share some methodological assumptions with
ANT ± including a preference for ethnography as a way to approach the
study of law.62 ANT's particular concerns for relationality, multiplicity,
contingency, and for materiality as constitutive of such dimensions of social
ordering, distinguishes it from other types of (socio)-legal scholarship (and
generates its own conceptual and empirical challenges). But as well as
emphasizing the original features of ANT, building on overlaps with other
law and society scholarship is essential for those who seek to engage ANT
for their study of law. Unlike when ANT started within the relatively nascent
field of science studies, we have the benefit of already having access to a
vast array of thorough empirical engagements with the complexity of law,
both in its making and in its practice. This literature has enabled us to
question the multiple lives of law, and indeed has broadened the scope of
who matters, and how, to its story, rendered visible paths of resistance
against its workings, and participated in decentring the story of law from the
mouth of the law itself, and its peculiar human spokespersons.
Bringing an ANT sensibility into the law does not need to break all such
kinships and connections, nor deny some of the patterns of the workings of
law and entailed relationships that we have elsewhere observed. At the same
time, it inevitably means disrupting some of the assumptions made by
previous scholarship ± including, for example, an assymetrical attention to
humans, a reliance on categorizations and dichotomies, or an expectation
that the `legal' can be identified in a relatively stable and/or predictable way.
In a field such as law, where earlier scholarship has demonstrated patterns of
exclusion, imbalances, and foundational as well as everyday violence,
juggling the need to disrupt with a desire to continue to care for such patterns
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brings its own challenges. I suggest that approaching law as a matter of
care63 provides a way to think through and work with the long-standing
dilemma of how to bring critique, and politics, into ANT analysis. Notably,
proposing an ANT sensibility for the study of law can be done with a
commitment to a manner of ethnographic research that seeks voices of and
about the law that are less heard, sites that have been less explored, while
remaining alert to our own standpoints. In such endeavours, building on what
other careful ethnographies have already enabled us to notice of the par-
ticularities (or indeed sameness and non-exceptionality) of legalities, as (and
in) complex sites of relations and lived interactions, can enrich stories. This
is so, even if we accept that such political commitment always remains
speculative: sites will almost never be quite as we imagine; causality will
rarely be linear; superimposed explanatory frameworks will not suffice to
explain relations in the messiness that ANT has helped render visible ± and
should remain committed to.
Legal consciousness is one stream of scholarship that, as an example,
shares some of the questions and some of the tools of ANT, in its
commitment to look at displacements and translations in the law, and of
exploring the multiplicity of relationships that contribute to creating what
law is and does.64 More broadly, legal anthropology has provided some
insights into the complexities of legal relations once we are outside of the
most clear-cut instances of legal events.65 Yet such approaches do not share
ANT's attention to materials as socially fluid, nor its particular interest for
ontological multiplicity and the heterogeneity of the social. This has
significant consequences for the type of analysis it allows, and indeed for the
end result of what it can or cannot render visible. Here, ANT can be
envisaged as a way to work with, disrupt, and take into new directions such
other approaches, notably by expanding the range of what we can see as
mattering to the making of the social (and all the resulting implications).
Where Annelise Riles has used aspects of ANT (or an ANT sensibility) to
think about legal documents, she has taken such a leap into building upon,
yet disrupting, our thinking about the law.66
By reimagining the heterogeneity of the modes of ordering that legal
relations are based upon, but also by rearticulating the role of such legal
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relations in conditioning, framing, and colonizing other forms of networked
connections, ANT can open up important directions in law and society
scholarship. ANT's proposal to pay renewed attention to materiality not as a
given, but as an entry point, invites us to reimagine (socio-)legal relations as
heterogeneous, multiple, and always fluid, subject to new rewritings and
transformations. This provides subtle but important ways to revisit what are
the many connections through which law circulates, how they can matter to
its practice and its modes of action, can produce unexpected effects, render
some agents visible or indeed hide others from view. In a field such as law
where human relations often receive central attention, such a shift toward
material connections is significant, and has the potential to disrupt how we
imagine what can or cannot be taken for granted as we consider what law is,
where law is, how it is enabled to act, or indeed what it takes for particular
relations to produce (or not) forms of legalities. Going perhaps against the
grain of early ANT research, I see the opening of such questions as most
pertinent if we also maintain firmly in mind their political implications, and
indeed those of the law itself (in all its uncertain forms). Without negating
the usefulness of a symmetrical approach to the social, or of the distributive
nature of agency, as analytical tools or methods, I remain particularly
concerned with the possibilities of learning with others who, using other
tools that share some if not all those of ANT, have demonstrated the complex
imbalances that shape the day-to-day of legal experiences, as well as with
those who have reminded us of the significance of positionality, both in the
differential and multiple existences of legalities, and at the level of how this
can be practiced when a researcher tries to make sense of law.
Finally, and through such re-reading of relations, the human actors of law
can be reimagined as particular forms of cyborgs, whose ability to circulate
are conditioned by legal possibilities67 that are themselves often inherently
colonizing, gendered, and exclusive. While ANT at its core remains a
toolbox for making sense of particular moments of interaction and processes
of enrolment, relations, and (un)settlements, acknowledging the violences
and imbalances of law, but also a persisting collective blindness of
scholarship to particular sites, experiences or voices, may be a useful depar-
ture point. In other words, to fully explore how ANT can be used in the study
of law, we should stay with the trouble, to borrow Haraway's phrase, and
seek not to develop `a theory of law' (of what it is, how it works or what it
does) but instead to broaden our imaginary of law through `partial, locatable,
critical knowledges sustaining the possibilities of webs of connections called
solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology.'68 ANT
offers an opportunity to explore the multiple ontologies of orderings that
constitute legalities, while moving beyond the human-centredness of legal
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analysis and paying attention to the role of complex materials in building and
settling particular connections. In a field such as law, as it has been in
science, however, caring for the politics of such connections is critical.
CONCLUSIONS
In this brief introduction to what ANT can bring to the study of law, or what
doing `ANT and law' might involve, I have tried to engage both `classic ANT
tenets' and the further insights that critiques and correlated approaches have
developed over the years. I have suggested two main ways in which ANT can
be helpful: first, as a way to question the boundaries of what constitutes law
and legalities, and also to bring new insights into their modes of action.
Second, as a methodological call for a furtherance of thorough ethnographies
of law that pay attention to both materiality and relationality. In addition, I
have proposed that such efforts should remain alert to the theorists, notably
feminist thinkers, who have worked alongside ANT, but who have adjusted
languages and perspectives to emphasize the political and ethical
responsibilities of our own positionings. Overall, `ANT in/and law' may be
better sketched as a `modest method'69 that remains aware of the fractal
nature of knowledge and of the significance of standpoints in its production.
For socio-legal studies, ANT could be at its most powerful and useful if we
were to use it to continue to illustrate the frictions inherent to legalities and to
explore what multiplicity means in the context of law, as social process and as
institution. ANT's attention to heterogeneity, fluidity, and relationality can
offer meaningful and disruptive analytical tools, unpacking through thick
descriptions of everyday material practices particular ways in which the
features of law, as frequently generating or perpetuating exclusions or
inequalities, operate. As they continue to interrogate such potential, I suggest
that legal scholars need to embrace ANT in its multiplicity ± pre and post ±
but also build onto the ethnographic knowledge we already have as to how
fluid practices of il/legality may be, and may act, in the everyday. In doing so,
we can open new translations of ANT that are alert to the political
implications and blind-spots of academic critique.
(This article is the first in a series aimed at introducing the reader to
methods and theories that might be relevant to advancing socio-legal
research projects. They are written for the curious rather than the expert
reader and they provide illustrations of how theories, methods, and
frameworks have been employed and might be used in your work. As
always, the Editorial Board invites you to identify that which requires
further explanation and progression for the benefit of the academy.)
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